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Case Notes
The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Unrequested
Evidence: United States v. Agurs
The constitutional duty of a prosecutor to disclose to an ac-
cused evidence which might exculpate him has been a recurring
issue before the United States Supreme Court over the past four
decades1 and the subject of a great deal of legal commentary.2
Once again the Supreme Court has addressed itself to the sub-
ject of prosecutorial disclosure in the recent case of United
States v. Agurs.3
The Agurs decision is of particular importance to those per-
sons presently engaged in the operation of our criminal adver-
sary system for it establishes a new constitutional rule of law,
while simultaneously attempting to clarify prior decisions
which have been the basis of much of the previously mentioned
legal commentary. The decision in Agurs once again brings to
1. E.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28
(1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
rehearing denied, 294 U.S. 732 (1935).
2. E.g., Note, Materiality and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining the
Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure, 59 IOWA L. REV. 433 (1973); Comment, Suppres-
sion: The Prosecution's Failure to Disclose Evidence Favorable to the Defense,
7 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 348 (1973); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Pro-
secutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 112 (1972); Comment, Disclosure
and Discovery in Criminal Cases: Where Are We Headed?, 6 DUQUESNE U.L.
REV. 41 (1967-1968); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evi-
dence to the Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964); Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor
to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 858 (1960).
3. 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
the forefront the broader issue of the overall role of the pros-
ecutor in our criminal justice system.4
To place the principle enunciated in the Agurs decision into
perspective, it will first be necessary, through prior case law, to
trace the development of the duty to disclose.5 The Agurs case
itself will then be discussed with particular emphasis on the new
rule espoused by the majority opinion and the dissenting opin-
ion's objections to it. Finally, implications of the decision will be
examined, as will the broader issue of the role of a prosecutor in
today's criminal justice system.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Early cases dealing with the disclosure of evidence by the
prosecution dealt with situations involving the prosecution's
intentional use of known perjured testimony to obtain a convic-
tion.6 Such prosecutorial misconduct was held to be inconsis-
tent with the concept of a fair trial and to constitute a denial of
due process.7
Later cases adopted the position that where the perjured tes-
timony of a witness was known to be false by the prosecution,
although not suborned by him, and though the perjured tes-
timony did not bear directly on the accused's guilt or innocence,
the prosecutor's failure to disclose such facts would constitute a
denial of due process.8 The Court's focus in these early cases
was not the harm suffered by the accused, but rather it was the
misconduct of the prosecutor which warranted a reversal of the
conviction.9
In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland,10 the Court con-
sidered the question of whether the suppression of favorable
evidence by the prosecution alone would be a violation of due
process. Unlike the earlier cases, there was no claim of the use
of perjured testimony. The defense had requested to examine
pretrial statements of the defendant's companion in the crime.
One of these statements contained an admission that the com-
4. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1934); JACKSON, The
Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 18 (1940); CAREY, The Role of a Pros-
ecutor in a Free Society, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 317 (1976).
5. For an indepth analysis of case law prior to the Agurs decision see
authorities n.2.
6. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213
(1942).
7. 294 U.S. at 112; 317 U.S. at 216.
8. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
9. 74 YALE L.J. 136, 138-39 (1964), supra n.2.
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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panion had done the actual killing. The prosecutor disclosed to
the defense all statements by the companion, except the crucial
admission of the killing itself. The failure to disclose this state-
ment was the result of a good faith mistake by the prosecutor
who believed the evidence was inadmissible at trial and thus
that disclosure was not required. In holding the defendant had
been denied due process of law, the Court espoused a new
constitutional standard:
Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.11
The rule enunciated in Brady left open a number of ques-
tions.12 Of particular importance was whether a request by the
defense was a condition precedent to the constitutional duty to
disclose, and whether the constitutional duty to disclose mate-
rial evidence extended to all evidence admissible and useful to
the defense? 13 Included in the latter question was the corrollary
question of what degree of prejudice must be shown to make a
new trial necessary.
Three pertinent cases followed the Brady decision. 4 Each
examined the prosecutorial disclosure issue, but each, in its
majority opinion, failed to define what constituted "materiality"
under the Brady standard. 15 Thus, when the Supreme Court
11. Id. at 87.
12. 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1972), supra n.2.
13. Id.
14. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) which involved allegations by the
defendant in a rape case that the state unconstitutionally suppressed evidence
favorable to the defense. The alleged suppressed evidence related primarily to
the credibility of the prosecution; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)
which involved allegations by the defendant that the state's failure to disclose to
the defense that the prosecution's key witness linking the defendant to the crime
had been promised immunity from government prosecution constituted a depri-
vation of due process; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) which involved
allegations by the defendant in a murder case that post conviction relief was
required due to the state's unconstitutional suppression of evidence favorable to
the defense. The alleged suppressed evidence consisted of a prior misidentifica-
tion of the defendant by a state's witness and a withheld police diagram of the
murder scene.
15. Although the Court established the general principle of disclosure in
Brady, the majority of Justices have consistently avoided defining the material-
ity standard. In Giles new evidence was introduced negating the need to define
materiality. In Giglio the Court simply reaffirmed the broad terminology previ-
ously stated in Brady, Napue, and other Supreme Court decisions. Similarly in
addressed the issued in Agurs, those unanswered questions
raised by Brady v. Maryland were again confronted. This time,
however, the Court attempted to answer them.
United States v. Agurs
The defendant, Linda Agurs, was convicted of second degree
murder for the killing of James Sewell and was sentenced to a
term of five to twenty-five years' imprisonment.
Sewell and Agurs had registered at a motel as man and wife
and had been assigned a room without a bath. Approximately
fifteen minutes later the desk clerk and two other employees
heard a woman's scream from the room occupied by Sewell and
Agurs. Upon forcing their way into the room, they discovered
the two on the bed struggling with a knife. The employees sepa-
rated them and summoned an ambulance for Sewell who was
suffering from knife wounds. Agurs left the building at that
time, but surrendered voluntary to the police the next day.
Sewell died from stab wounds in his chest and abdomen. Addi-
tional wounds on his arms and hands suggested an attempt by
him to repel an attack.
The prosecution's theory at trial was that the defendant was a
prostitute who had picked Sewell up and had taken him to the
motel to ply her trade; that after rendering her services, and
while Sewell was in the bathroom down the hall, she rummaged
through his clothing and removed the money she found there;
and, that Sewell, returning, caught her in the act and attempted
to retrieve his money whereupon she stabbed him with a knife,
which lay amongst his clothes.
The defense argued that the wounds were inflicted in self-
defense; that this defense was supported by the fact that she
had screamed for help; that upon entering the room the clerk
and employees saw the victim on top of the defendant; and that
the victim had been in possession of two knives the day of the
incident-a bowie knife and a pocket knife-indicating he was a
violence-prone person.
Defense counsel had become aware of the possibility that
Sewell had been arrested or convicted of violent crimes in the
past. However, under the mistaken belief that the victim's prior
convictions 6 would be inadmissible to prove self defense if it
Moore, the Court adhered to the principles of Brady and Napue, but found that
the evidence was not material enough to warrant a new trial. It did not attempt
to define materiality. . . 59 IOWA L. REV. 433, 436-441 (1973), supra n.2; accord, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 125-129 (1972), supra n.2.
16. United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Sewell had
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could not be shown that the defendant had been aware of them,
her counsel failed to initiate a search for any such prior record.
No formal request for discovery was made, and the prosecution
did not advise the defense of the victim's criminal record. Three
months after her conviction, the defendant's counsel, discover-
ing that such evidence was admissible even if not known to the
defendant at the time of the act, 17 immediately filed a motion for
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The government opposed the motion arguing that the pros-
ecution was under no duty to disclose the victim's prior record
since the defense had made no request as required by Brady v.
Maryland; that the evidence was not newly discovered since it
was readily discoverable in advance of trial; and, that the vic-
tim's prior record was immaterial in the present case.
The district court denied the defense motion holding that al-
though there was a duty to disclose material evidence despite
the absence of a defense request, the victim's prior record was
not "material" in this case.18 Thus the court concluded that the
defendant's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the due proc-
ess clause of the fifth amendment, had not been violated.
After dismissing the claim by the defense that her defense
counsel's failure to bring the victim's record of conviction be-
fore the jury had deprived her of her sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel, 19 the court of appeals reversed
the district court, finding that the evidence was material and
that its nondisclosure required a new trial because the jury
might have returned a different verdict if the evidence had been
received.20 Citing two earlier decisions2 the court enunciated
one of the tests of materiality which had been developing in the
lower courts since Brady v. Maryland:
... whether the undisclosed evidence, if brought to the attention of
been convicted in 1963 for assault and carrying a dangerous weapon and in 1971
for carrying a dangerous weapon. The weapon in each instance had been a
knife.
17. Id. at 1251. See, United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
18. Testimony at trial had revealed the victim's character, and the jury
knew he had been carrying two knives on the day of the murder.
19. Id. at 1251-1253.
20. Id. at 1254.
21. Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Levin v. Clark, 408
F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
the jury, might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about
the appellant's guilt.
22
THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE
After reviewing the facts of the case and its treatment in the
lower courts, 23 Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority of
the Court, addressed the issues of the case with an analysis of
the Brady rule:
The rule of Brady v. Maryland, arguably, applies in three quite differ-
ent situations. Each involves the discovery, after trial, of informa-
tion which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the
defense. 24 (emphasis added)
In the first situation, where the prosecution has knowingly
used perjured testimony, a reversal of the conviction is war-
ranted, ". . . if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury., 25 The
majority would apply this strict standard of materiality to the
rule of Brady v. Maryland26 in cases involving the known use of
perjured testimony.27
In the second situation, where the prosecution has failed to act
on a defense request for specific information, a reversal is war-
ranted if the subject matter of the request is "material." The
Court never directly defined what was a "material request" in
this second situation, but it did state:
... implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the
suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial...
when the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the
failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable. 28
In contrast to the second situation, where there has been a
request for specific information, the third situation discussed
by the Court involves only a general request for all "discover-
able material or evidence" or no defense request at all. In the
former situation the prosecution is on notice of the specific
22. United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d at 1253 (1975) (emphasis added). See,
e.g., Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1966) (if the evidence withheld
would have a substantial possibility of affecting the decision, it is deemed
material to warrant a new trial); Weaver v. United States, 418 F.2d 475 (8th Cir.
1969) (If there is any doubt that the suppressed evidence might have made a
difference); Moore v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Evidence which
may be merely helpful to the defense).
23. 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2395-2397 (1976).
24. Id. at 2397.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. The Court stated the rationale for the strict standard of materiality was
.not just because they involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more impor-
tantly because they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial
process." 96 S. Ct. at 2397.
27. E.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
28. 96 S. Ct. at 2398-2399 (1976).
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evidence sought by the defense. However, in the latter situation,
the evidence itself must furnish the notice to the prosecution
which gives rise to a duty to disclose it to the defense. Therefore,
in the absence of a request, a stronger showing of materiality is
required to warrant a new trial.29 In this regard, the Agurs
Court noted:
The duty to respond to a general request or no request at all is depen-
dant on the evidence itself. . . if the evidence is so clearly supportive
of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to
produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is made.
30
Thus, the Court had negatively answered one of the major
questions unresolved by Brady-the duty to disclose is not con-
ditioned on the presence of a defense request, but rather on the
evidence itself.
However, the Court rejected the standard of materiality ap-
plied by the court of appeals to give rise to that duty. The court
of appeals had required disclosure of any information that
"might" affect the jury's verdict; however, the United States,
Supreme Court stated:
The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might
have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the
trial does not establish materiality in the consitutional sense...31
Instead the majority held that the proper test of materiality to
invoke the constitutional duty of the prosecution to volunteer
exculpatory evidence to the defense is "whether the omitted
evidence created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist. ,32 (emphasis added)
The Court placed the butden of determining materiality on
both the prosecution and the trial judge. The prosecution must
decide, both prior to and during the trial, what information in
his possession, which is unknown to the defense, must be volun-
teered by asking the question, "If I fail to disclose this informa-
tion to the defense, will I prevent the jury, in the opinion of the
29. "The test of materiality in a case like Brady in which specific informa-
tion has been requested by the defense is not necessarily the same as in a case in
which no such request has been made." 96 S. Ct. at 2398, citing, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
at 115-117 (1972), supra, n.2.
30. Id. at 2399.
31. Id. at 2400. The Court noted that such a standard of materiality would
require the prosecutor to open his files to the defense as a matter of routine
practice which the Constitution does not demand.
32. Id. at 2401.
trial judge, from entertaining a reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the defendant which would not otherwise have existed?" If
answered affirmatively, the prosecutor must volunteer such in-
formation. However, where the prosecution either intentionally,
negligently, or innocently fails to produce such evidence to the
defense, and its existence and content is discovered following
conviction of the defendant, it is the duty of the trial judge to
evaluate the omitted evidence in the context of the entire record
to answer the question," Am I still convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt of the defendant's guilt?" 33
Mr. Justice Stevens applied this test of materiality to the facts
in the Agurs case, noting that the trial judge had evaluated the
victim's prior convictions in light of the entire trial record and
still remained convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.34 Therefore, the Court reversed the court of
appeals decision and reinstated the conviction concluding that
since the victim's prior record was not "material" in the context
of the entire trial, its nondisclosure did not deprive the defend-
ant of a fair trial.35
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom
Mr. Justice Brennan joined, took issue with the majority opin-
ion on two grounds. First, Justice Marshall argued that the
burden imposed on the defendant to show constitutional error
was too severe; second, he maintained that the majority rule
usurped the function of the jury as the trier of fact in a criminal
case.36 According to the dissenters the burden on the defendant
to show that the omitted evidence created a reasonable doubt
which did not otherwise exist is as severe, if not more severe,
than the burden on the defendant to show that evidence newly
discovered from a neutral source after trial probably would
have resulted in acquittal-this latter test having been recog-
nized by the majority as being too severe a burden in situations
where the evidence was already in the State's possession.37
The dissent would ease the burden on the defendant to a
showing:
33. Id. at 2404.
34. The Court noted the criminal record of the victim would be largely
cumulative in light of the testimony already indicating that the victim had been
carrying two knives when he checked into the motel. Id. at 2404. For a discus-
sion of the effects of cumulative evidence on the trier of fact see, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 112, 129-130 (1972), supra n.2.
35. 96 S. Ct. at 2404 (1976).
36. Id. at 2405-2406.
37. Id.
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.. . that there is a significant chance that the withheld evidence,
developed by skilled counsel, would have induced a reasonable doubt
in the minds of jurors to avoid a conviction.38
and took issue with the majority's rule that:
... so long as the evidence does not create a reasonable doubt in the
mind of the judge, regardless of whether the evidence is such that
reasonable men could disagree as to its import...31
no constitutional error was committed. He argued that the rule
developed in the federal courts, unlike that of the majority opin-
ion, recognized that the determination of materiality of the evi-
dence must be in terms of the impact of such evidence on the
jury, not on the mind of the judge.40 Applying the lesser burden
of the dissent, Justice Marshall would have affirmed the court
of appeals judgment that there was a significant chance that
the evidence withheld would have induced a reasonable doubt
in the minds of enough jurors to avoid the conviction.4
CONCLUSION
The Agurs decision represents the Court's attempt to define
what it meant in its earlier decision of Brady v. Maryland by the
use of the term "material evidence." While attempting to explain
the Brady rule, the Court has expanded it to encompass a duty
to disclose material exculpatory evidence despite the lack of the
defense request. The removal of the requirement of a defense
request as a prerequisite to the constitutional duty to disclose
would appear to be an expansion of the prosecutor's role. How-
ever, analysis of the Court's method in defining "materiality"
reveals a hindsight approach which provides no practical guide
for prosecutors in assessing the character of evidence in their
files. While this approach can be applied by the trial judge
"after the damage" has or may have occurred, the Court's rule
does not provide a practical method for "damage prevention"
prior to and during trial. The standard, as it stands now, in-
volves pure speculation on the part of the prosecutor as to
whether non-disclosure will lead to reversal.
38. Id. at 2406. This was basically the test imposed by the court of appeals.
510 F.2d at 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 2406.
40. For those federal court decisions establishing this rule see 96 S. Ct. at
2407 & n.5.
41. Id. at 2407.
The Court has made clear that there is no duty on the pros-
ecutor to provide the defense with unlimited discovery of the
everything known by the prosecutor, thus rejecting the argu-
ment of some commentators for disclosure of all "relevant"
information.42 The Court fails to recognize, however, that appli-
cation of the rule enunciated in Agurs will have the practical
effect of requiring prosecutors to do what the Court states they
are not required to do, i.e., disclose all relevant information, for
the Court noted, ". . . the significance of an item of evidence can
seldom be predicted until the entire record is complete.
43
The duty to disclose evidence material to the defense is a
departure from the traditional adversary role of the prosecutor.
The central figure in the charging process is the prosecutor, and
for a variety of reasons prosecutors do not charge people they
believe to be innocent." Once charged, however, the prosecutor
has made a decision which represents a commitment of his
resources to convict the accused. To require a prosecutor to
re-orient his perspective in evaluating the evidence in his pos-
session as to its potential favorable impact on the defense's case
is an impractical, if not impossible, requirement.45
The Agurs decision is important in that it once again brings
into focus the broader, recurring issue of the key role of the
prosecutor in today's criminal justice system.4 6 If the role of the
prosecutor in criminal prosecutions remains " . . . not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done" 47 and " . . . to
seek justice not merely convict" 48, it is difficult to perceive how
full disclosure of evidence which "might affect the outcome of
the case" to the defense would impair such a role.
The Court's rationale for applying a strict standard of mate-
riality in cases where convictions were obtained through the
known use of perjured testimony was not based upon pros-
ecutorial misconduct, but upon the reasoning that such convic-
tions involve a "corruption of the truth-seeking process.
49 It
42. Id. at 2399. See, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. at 132, supra n.2.
43. Id. at 2399.
44. See, e.g., F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME 347 (1969).
45. For a discussion of the arguments for and against an open file policy to
alleviate the prosecutor's duty of determining materiality see, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
at 136-137 (1972), supra n.2.
46. CAREY, Role of a Prosecutor in a Free Society, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 317
(1976).
47. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934).
48. ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 5, EC 7-13.
49. 96 S. Ct. at 2397 (1976).
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seems equally obvious that suppression of evidence, whether
intentional, negligent, or innocent, corrupts the truth-seeking
process. Thus, the standard in evidence suppression cases
should be the same as in the perjury cases; "the conviction must
be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony (or suppressed evidence) could or did affect the judg-
ment of the jury. '50 Despite the Court's rejection of this line of
reasoning as a "sporting theory of justice, not required by the
Constitution",5 ' for the prosecution to adhere to its duty to "seek
justice and not merely convict" while simultaneously applying
the rule in Agurs, the net practical effect will be full disclosure
of all relevant material.
52
CHRISTIAN F. DUBIA, JR.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2400.
52. Ignoring the traditional duty of the prosecutor to "seek justice and not
merely convict", Justice Marshall points out that the majority role (by itself)
reinforces the natural tendency of the prosecutor to overlook evidence favor-
able to the defense, and creates an incentive for the prosecutor to resolve close
questions of disclosure in favor of concealment. Id. at 2397.

